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JUSTICE STEVENS AND THE CHEVRON PUZZLE
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ABSTRACT—Justice Stevens’s most famous decision—Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
v. NRDC—has come to stand for an institutional choice approach to agency
interpretation. But there is no evidence that Justice Stevens shared this
understanding. Instead, he followed an equilibrium-preserving approach,
which sought to nudge agencies to reconsider decisions the Justice regarded
as unreasonable. Although the equilibrium-preserving approach is
consistent with what a common law judge would embrace, the institutional
choice perspective is probably more consistent with the needs of the
modern administrative state, and it appears the Court as a whole is
gradually adopting that perspective.
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INTRODUCTION
It was a privilege to speak at the gathering honoring the judicial career
of Justice Stevens. I was able to observe Justice Stevens on the Court for
many years—first as a law clerk to Justice Blackmun, later as a lawyer in
the Solicitor General’s office, and finally as an academic and occasional
participant in Supreme Court cases. It was a special honor for me when I
was named the inaugural John Paul Stevens Professor of Law at
Northwestern in 1993, a position I held for ten years. This was because I
had come to regard Justice Stevens as the Court’s best lawyer. One may not
always agree with the results Justice Stevens reached—I certainly did not.
But he was the quintessential common law judge, who approached each
case with its own particularity. He was always prepared, with a sure grasp
of the record and the relevant precedents in each case, and an uncanny
insight into strengths and weaknesses of the competing positions. This
meant he had a unique ability to spot—and expose—the weaknesses in
every lawyer’s case, to the frequent discomfort of the advocates. For this, if
no other reason, the Court was greatly strengthened as an institution during
his long tenure.
This Article addresses Justice Stevens’s most famous decision,
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC.1 Certainly it is his most cited. A Westlaw
search reveals that Chevron has been cited in 11,760 judicial decisions and
2130 administrative decisions.2 It continues to accumulate judicial citations
at the rate of about 1000 per year. It is eclipsed only by decisions like Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins3 (14,663 decisions) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly4 (47,339 decisions). The company it keeps provides a clue about
the reason for its frequent invocation. Chevron has become the leading
decision expressing the standard courts should apply in reviewing an
administrative agency’s interpretation of a statute it administers. As such, it
has transsubstantive significance—it is potentially relevant in any case in
which an administrative body has weighed in on a statutory interpretation
issue before a court, which includes a high percentage of cases on the
noncriminal docket.

1
2
3
4
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This and all following citation counts are based on Westlaw searches conducted on July 28, 2011.
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Chevron’s significance goes far beyond its utility as a statement of the
standard of review, however. This is revealed by its frequency of citation in
law review articles. Chevron has been cited by 8009 articles included in the
Westlaw database.5 The fascination academics have for Chevron means it
has now been cited far more than Erie (5052), a decision Bruce Ackerman
once described as the “Pole Star” for an entire generation of legal
scholarship.6 Indeed, Chevron’s frequency of citation in law review articles
puts it in roughly the same league as Marbury v. Madison7 (8492), which is
perhaps appropriate given that Chevron has been called the “counterMarbury” for the administrative state.8
When we seek to evaluate this most consequential of decisions in light
of what we know about its author, however, we encounter a puzzle.
Chevron has come to stand for judicial deference to administrative
interpretations of law; yet overall, Justice Stevens was not especially
deferential to agency decisions.9 Chevron has also been understood to mark
the beginning of a willingness on the part of the federal courts to share
interpretational authority with administrative agencies; yet there is little
indication that Justice Stevens ever doubted the unqualified judicial
prerogative to “say what the law is.”10 The disconnect between Chevron and
the revealed values of its author has led commentators to search for some
metaprinciple that would square things up between Justice Stevens and his
most famous progeny.11
The solution to the puzzle, in my view, lies in Justice Stevens’s
orientation to deciding cases in the manner of a common law judge. He
viewed each challenge to administrative action as a discrete occasion to ask
5

In addition, Chevron has also been cited in 30 American Law Reports articles, 58 Westlaw
journals, and over 3600 miscellaneous other pieces of legal authority including digests, practice guides,
circulars, and practitioner’s handbooks.
6
BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 272 n.4 (1977).
7
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
8
Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE L.J.
2580, 2589 (2006).
9
Justice Stevens concurred with agency interpretations in 60.9% of cases from 1975–2006. William
N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren B. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency
Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO L.J. 1083, 1154 tbl.20 (2008). This means
he was less deferential than Justices Scalia (64.5% from 1986–2006), Ginsburg (69.5% from 1993–
2006), Breyer (72.0% from 1994–2006), and Burger (81.3% from 1969–1986), although somewhat
more deferential than Justice Brennan (52.6% from 1956–1990). Id.
10
Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
11
Especially notable is Kathryn A. Watts, From Chevron to Massachusetts: Justice Stevens’s
Approach to Securing the Public Interest, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1021, 1040 (2010). Professor Watts
argues that Justice Stevens deferred to agency interpretations when a statute contains conflicting
purposes (Chevron) but not when the statute contains a single dominant purpose (Massachusetts). Id. at
1052. The problem with this is that every statute contains a least two purposes: a desire to achieve a goal
and a desire to limit pursuit of that goal after some point. If it is unclear where Congress drew the line,
then deference should be in order.
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whether the agency was proceeding in a reasonable fashion. If the agency
was acting within the bounds of reason as he saw it, then he was happy to
defer.12 But if he thought the agency had gone off track, either by exhibiting
excessive regulatory zeal or by abdicating its mandate to address matters of
public concern, he considered it appropriate for the Court to provide a
nudge pushing the agency back toward the path of reason.13 One might call
this an equilibrium-preserving approach to judicial review.14 I do not favor
this approach myself: it puts too much stock in the ability of judges to
discern the path of reason and hence suffers from the same kind of hubris
associated with the advocates of judicial “pragmatism.”15 But it is not at all
surprising that it would be congenial to a common law judge, especially one
possessed of unusual talent and self-confidence.16
I will begin by offering a thumbnail sketch of why I think Chevron
came to stand for a development of transformative significance. I will then
explain briefly why I think Justice Stevens never intended to endorse the
perspective for which his opinion has come to stand. I will close with some
reflections about why I think Justice Stevens regarded the function of
judicial review of administrative action to entail what I have called an
equilibrium-preserving approach, and why I think this is problematic.
I.

INTEGRATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE APPROACHES TO
JUDICIAL REVIEW
Chevron’s importance, from a jurisprudential perspective, is that it is
associated with a fundamental change in the relationship between courts
and agencies.17 Before Chevron, courts approached agency interpretations
using what I will call the integrative method of interpretation.18 Under this
approach, the court seeks to fix the meaning of a contested statutory
12

See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 788 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting); City of
Chicago v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 348 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
13
See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); see also infra notes 61–71 and
accompanying text (discussing Massachusetts v. EPA).
14
Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip F. Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L.
REV. 26, 28 (1994) (describing law as “an equilibrium, a state of balance among competing forces or
institutions”).
15
E.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 40, 246–48 (2010).
16
The connection between the common law style of judging and aggressive judicial review of
questions of law finds an early and articulate proponent in JOHN DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE
AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE UNITED STATES (1927). See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Article
III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the Appellate Review Model of Administrative Law,
111 COLUM. L. REV. 939, 972–79 (2011) (discussing Dickinson’s influence on the development of the
appellate review model of administrative law).
17
Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.:
Sometimes Great Cases Are Made Not Born, in STATUTORY INTERPRETATION STORIES, 166–68
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. et al. eds., 2011).
18
For further explication of integrative interpretation, see Thomas W. Merrill, Faithful Agent,
Integrative, and Welfarist Interpretation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1565, 1569–72 (2010).
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provision by integrating or synthesizing as many data points as possible that
bear on the question of its meaning. The objective is to adopt the
interpretation that supplies the best “fit” with these data points. The relevant
data points include, of course, the text and legislative history of the statute.
But they also include past statutory interpretation precedents by courts,
evidence of approval or disapproval of past interpretations by Congress,
and—most crucially for present purposes—administrative interpretations.
Under the integrative approach, administrative interpretations are
generally factored into statutory interpretation through a process that grades
the agency interpretation along a number of dimensions. For example, the
longevity of an administrative interpretation is a critical factor.19 The longer
an administrative interpretation has been around, the more weight it is
given, the assumption being that longstanding interpretations are more
likely to have induced reliance by a variety of actors, and protecting
reliance is an important judicial function. Other grading factors include
whether the interpretation has been adopted contemporaneously with the
enactment of the statute,20 whether the issue is a technical one as to which
the agency has expertise,21 whether the agency has offered a reasoned
explanation for its interpretation,22 and whether the interpretation had been
adopted through a process in which affected interests had been allowed to
present their views.23
After Chevron, a different approach to assessing administrative
interpretations began to emerge. I will call this the “institutional choice”
approach to agency interpretation. The root idea here is not to seek the best
interpretation in each case, but to ask which institution is the preferred
interpreter of the issue in question.24 The choice of the preferred institution,
moreover, is understood to be under the control of Congress. Consequently,
the inquiry is framed in terms of congressional delegation: has Congress
delegated authority to the agency or to the court to act as the primary

19
Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 1018–19
(1992).
20
Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933) (“[A] practice has
peculiar weight when it involves a contemporaneous construction of a statute by the men charged with
the responsibility of setting its machinery in motion . . . .”).
21
Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Cent. Lincoln Peoples’ Util. Dist., 467 U.S. 380, 390 (1984) (noting the
“technical and complex” nature of the subject matter and the agency’s particular expertise).
22
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (holding that an administrator’s
determination should be weighed upon “the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it
power to persuade”).
23
See Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549,
562 (1985).
24
See generally ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY
OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION (2006) (urging a super-strong version of the Chevron doctrine based on
principles of comparative institutional choice analysis).
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interpreter of the statute in question?25 If the agency has been chosen, then
the agency should fill gaps and ambiguities in the statute, provided it does
so reasonably. If the matter has been assigned to the courts, then the courts
should play this role.
I am not suggesting that all members of the Court have accepted the
institutional choice approach to agency interpretation. Some, like Justice
Breyer, seem resolutely committed to the old integrative method.26 Nor am I
suggesting that all of the difficulties posed by the institutional choice
approach have been worked out. The Court’s decision in United States v.
Mead Corp.,27 in particular, although generally consistent with the
institutional choice perspective, has sown much confusion in the lower
courts.28
But it is worth emphasizing the great divide between the integrative
and institutional choice approaches. Under the integrative method,
deference to agency views is always discretionary; under the institutional
choice approach, it is often mandated because it is implicitly required by
Congress.29 Under the integrative method, the focus is always on the
individual case and how it should be correctly decided; under the
institutional choice approach, the focus shifts to a higher order inquiry into
the allocation of institutional authority. Under the integrative method,
judges enjoy great flexibility in moving from one source of interpretative
data to another; under the institutional choice approach, the aspiration is to
confine judges to a sequential inquiry that remains uniform in all cases.
II. JUSTICE STEVENS AND THE INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE APPROACH
The new institutional choice perspective is associated with Chevron
and indeed is often called the “Chevron doctrine.” Yet I think it is clear that
Justice Stevens had no intention of advocating something like the
institutional choice approach when he authored the unanimous opinion for
the Court in Chevron. I say this for several reasons.
25
Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 881 (2001);
Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 196–97 (2006).
26
E.g., Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 89–90 (2007) (Breyer, J.)
(departing from two-step process prescribed by Chevron for “purposes of exposition”); Barnhart v.
Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002) (Breyer, J.) (considering multiple factors in applying Chevron);
Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 596 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Chevron made no
relevant change.”); Steven Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV.
363, 368 (1986).
27
533 U.S. 218 (2001).
28
See Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action,
58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1464 (2005); Adrian Vermeule, Introduction: Mead in the Trenches, 71 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 347, 355–56 (2003).
29
The mandate from Congress is widely acknowledged to be implicit because the express signals
Congress has given generally cut in favor of independent judicial judgment rather than deference. See
Merrill & Hickman, supra note 25, at 870–72.
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The first is based on the opinion itself. Chevron contains passages at
the beginning and end of the analytical portion of the opinion that have
been invoked in support of the institutional choice position. The famous
two-step characterization of the review function—instructing courts to ask
first whether Congress has directly spoken to the issue and if not, whether
the agency’s interpretation is reasonable30—contains no obvious place for
the grading factors central to the integrative approach. The opinion spoke
about express and implied delegations of interpretative authority by
Congress to agencies, and seemed to say that any ambiguity in a statute
administered by an agency is an implied delegation, making the agency the
preferred interpreter.31 And the opinion broke new ground by noting in a
closing paragraph that agencies are accountable to the President, who is
elected by all the people, and thus agencies are better suited to resolve
disputed policy questions, including disputes over the resolution of gaps
and ambiguities in statutes, than are nonrepresentative federal courts.32
These passages are of course the ones excerpted in casebooks and quoted
extensively in subsequent decisions.
But the Chevron opinion is relatively long—twenty-nine pages and
forty-one footnotes. If one reads the opinion from end to end, the overall
impression one gains is that it is not much different from an opinion
following the conventional integrative approach. There is a meticulous
discussion of the evolution of the statutory text,33 an examination of the
legislative history,34 and a discussion of legislative purposes.35 We find also
references to agency expertise, to the technical and complex subject matter,
to the EPA’s detailed and reasoned decisions, and to the need to reconcile
conflicting policies.36 Read as a whole, the passages that would later
become famous can be seen as a framing device for a thorough analysis of
particulars relevant under the then-standard integrative approach, and a
peroration designed to carry the reader away by associating the decision
with norms of judicial restraint.
Second, as I have detailed in other writing, there is no evidence from
what we know of the Court’s internal deliberations that any of the
participating Justices viewed Chevron as a decision of significance.37
Although the Justices were divided at conference, all participating Justices
were happy to join Justice Stevens’s draft opinion without commenting on
its content. Nor is there evidence that Justice Stevens himself regarded
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
See id. at 844.
See id. at 865–66.
Id. at 859–61.
Id. at 845–47.
Id. at 862–63.
Id. at 857, 864–65.
Merrill, supra note 17, at 180–84.
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Chevron as having inaugurated any change in the way courts approach
agency interpretations. Chevron’s status as a landmark decision was a
product of the D.C. Circuit’s response to the decision, Justice Scalia’s
advocacy as an emissary from the D.C. Circuit to the Supreme Court, and
the Justice Department’s relentless invocation of the decision in briefs filed
at all levels of the judicial system.38
Third, Justice Stevens authored three opinions after Chevron
expressing the view that where “pure question[s] of statutory construction”
are involved, courts should exercise independent judgment giving no
deference to executive or administrative views.39 This understanding of the
judicial role is what one would expect from a common law judge who
believes in the autonomy and “artificial reason” of the law.40 But it is clearly
inconsistent with the institutional choice perspective, which requires that
courts defer to administrative interpretations of pure questions of law,
provided Congress has delegated authority to the agency to make such
determinations.41
Fourth, if Justice Stevens intended that Chevron inaugurate some
transformative, institutional choice perspective, it is curious that he
remained mostly silent in later cases where the Court engaged in spirited
debate over rationale and preconditions for Chevron deference.42 Of course,
he never disowned Chevron, and he often applied it.43 But if he regarded
Chevron as a decision of great consequence, why would he not speak up in
support of that vision? Instead, he let other Justices expound on the
meaning and significance of his decision.
Aziz Huq, writing in this symposium, argues that Justice Stevens was
the architect of an “institution matching canon,” which is similar to what I
have called the institutional choice interpretation of Chevron.44 I am not
38

Id. at 188.
INS v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987); see also Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511,
531 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541
U.S. 677, 701–02 (2004).
40
Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Reason and Reasonableness in Review of Agency Decisions, 104 NW. U.
L. REV. 799, 821–24 (2010).
41
Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J.
511, 516.
42
See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006) (Justice Stevens joining Justice Kennedy’s opinion
for the Court without comment); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (Justice Stevens
joining Justice Souter’s opinion for the Court without comment); cf. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Assoc.
v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1003 (2005) (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that
subordination of a court of appeals to agency interpretations under Chevron may not apply to Supreme
Court interpretations, but offering no reason for the distinction); Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S.
576, 595 n.2 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (dissenting on the merits and stating in one unelaborated
footnote that he agrees with Justice Breyer about the meaning and significance of Chevron).
43
See Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 471 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Lopez v.
Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 245 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
44
Aziz Z. Huq, The Institution Matching Canon, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 417 (2012).
39
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convinced this is correct, at least as a characterization of the position of
Justice Stevens.
The primary evidence Professor Huq cites in support of Justice
Stevens’s institution matching approach is his very first opinion for the
Court, Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,45 which struck down a civil service
regulation barring those who are not American citizens from federal
employment. As Professor Huq acknowledges, the opinion is widely
regarded as a sport and has had little direct influence in terms of being cited
or followed.46 Perhaps more importantly from my perspective, which is
primarily biographical, Justice Stevens did not himself refer to the decision
in later opinions as supporting an institution matching approach.47 It is
particularly telling that Justice Stevens did not cite Hampton in Chevron,
which would be a natural thing to do if he had conceived of an institution
matching canon in Hampton and was then intent on extending this in later
decisions.
Professor Huq cites a number of more recent decisions that I agree can
be characterized as reflecting an institution matching perspective, such as
Apprendi v. New Jersey,48 United States v. Mead Corp.,49 and Gonzales v.
Oregon.50 Other than Apprendi, however, Justice Stevens played no
authorial role in these cases. It is particularly noteworthy that Professor Huq
strives valiantly to characterize Justice Stevens’s opinions for the Court in
Massachusetts v. EPA51 and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld52 as reflecting institution
matching. But in both cases he says, in effect, that Justice Stevens’s
objection was not to the identity of the deciding institution, but rather to the
quality of the reasoning it used in reaching the decision.53 To my mind, this
stretches the meaning of institution matching too far. To object to the
quality of reasoning is to engage in review on the merits, not to match
issues with institutions.
In short, I do not disagree with Professor Huq’s claim that institution
matching is an emergent theme in decisions of the Supreme Court in a
variety of areas. But I am not persuaded that Justice Stevens played a
leading role in this movement, or that he can even be regarded as a

45

426 U.S. 88 (1976).
See Huq, supra note 44.
47
See id. (“Justice Stevens himself would look back to Hampton occasionally as authority for the
more abstract proposition that government must ‘govern impartially’ and for the claim that restrictions
on constitutional interests can be authorized only on the basis of real, not hypothesized, justifications for
the government’s actions.” (footnote omitted)).
48
530 U.S. 466 (2000).
49
533 U.S. 218 (2001).
50
546 U.S. 243 (2006).
51
549 U.S. 497 (2007).
52
548 U.S. 557 (2006).
53
See Huq, supra note 44, at 443–47.
46
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proponent of this perspective. To the contrary, Justice Stevens was not a
proponent of the institutional choice reading of Chevron. He consistently
advanced a more modest reading of the decision and largely absented
himself from both internal and scholarly debate about whether Chevron is
appropriately regarded as mandating the institutional choice approach.
III. THE EQUILIBRIUM-PRESERVING FUNCTION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
If Justice Stevens was not a partisan of the institutional choice
perspective, how then should we characterize his approach to judicial
review of administrative interpretations of law?
This is my hypothesis: I believe that Justice Stevens saw the role of the
Court in administrative review cases as entailing an equilibrium-preserving
function. It is not the Court’s job to make regulatory policy. Still, Congress
has provided for judicial review in significant part so that courts can supply
a corrective for extreme or improvident decisions. Judicial review, in this as
in other contexts, is part of the checks and balances that keep our system of
government from veering off course or embracing positions that are
unreasonable. In support of this hypothesis, I will consider the four opinions
authored by Justice Stevens that are generally regarded as canonical in
administrative law. These are the four discussed and analyzed in nearly
every administrative law course in this country.
The first, from relatively early in Justice Stevens’s tenure on the Court,
is the so-called Benzene decision rendered in 1980, four years before
Chevron.54 The question as framed by the parties was whether the
Occupational Health and Safety Act (OSHA) required that potential
carcinogens in the workplace be regulated as long as it was economically
feasible to do so, or regulated only to the point where the costs exceeded the
benefits.55 The agency argued for feasibility; the industry for cost–benefit.56
Justice Stevens’s plurality opinion, which was to prove enormously
influential in the subsequent evolution of risk analysis,57 rejected both
approaches.58 Instead, he creatively interpreted the statute as requiring a
threshold determination by the agency that a cancer risk in the workplace is
“significant” before it undertakes to develop a standard that extrapolates
beyond existing epidemiological evidence.59
There is not a word in the opinion about deferring to OSHA’s
interpretation. What is clear is that Justice Stevens regarded the

54

See Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (Benzene), 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
Id. at 639.
56
Id.
57
Matthew D. Adler, Against “Individual Risk”: A Sympathetic Critique of Risk Assessment, 153 U.
PA. L. REV. 1121, 1128 (2005).
58
See Benzene, 448 U.S. at 640–43.
59
See id. at 646–48.
55
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government’s interpretation as unreasonable: it would give the agency, as
he wrote, “too much power over American industry” and would impose
enormous costs for what might be insubstantial benefits.60 The significant
risk threshold was designed to temper the perceived extremism of this view
without necessarily committing to the industry’s position that all regulations
had to be justified by a cost–benefit analysis. In effect, Justice Stevens used
the traditional power of judicial interpretation to force the agency—or
perhaps Congress—to reconsider whether it wanted to persist in what
seemed to be overregulation of the workplace.
The second example comes from late in Justice Stevens’s tenure: his
opinion for the Court in Massachusetts v. EPA61 holding that greenhouse
gases are air pollutants subject to regulation under the Clean Air Act.62
Massachusetts and others filed a petition asking the EPA to commence a
rulemaking to regulate tailpipe emissions of greenhouse gases thought to
contribute to global warming.63 The EPA denied the petition, citing a legal
analysis by its general counsel concluding that carbon dioxide and other
greenhouse gases are not air pollutants within the meaning of the Act.64
Justice Stevens rejected this construction under step one of the Chevron
framework.65 The Act defines air pollutant to include “any physical [or]
chemical . . . substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters
the ambient air.”66 Justice Stevens concluded that carbon dioxide is clearly a
chemical substance that enters the air.67 Therefore, the EPA was required to
consider whether its emission by motor vehicles “may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger” public welfare.68
The argument was purely textualist. The best argument on the other
side was that “ambient air” in the context of the Act referred to the layer of
atmosphere in which human beings live and breathe, since the regulatory
mechanisms in the Act only made sense in the context of these sorts of
pollutants.69 But the opinion resolutely rejected all arguments from statutory
structure, various legislative responses to climate change that seemed to
assume no existing EPA authority, the legislative response to other global
pollution problems, and the assignment of tasks to different agencies of
60

Id. at 651–52.
549 U.S. 497 (2007).
62
Id. at 532.
63
Id. at 510, 519–21.
64
Id. at 511.
65
Id. at 534–35.
66
42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2006).
67
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 528–29.
68
Id. at 528–29.
69
Id. at 559–60 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the many incompatibilities between
greenhouse gas regulation and the structure of the Clean Air Act, see Jonathan H. Adler, Heat Expands
All Things: The Proliferation of Greenhouse Gas Regulation Under the Obama Administration,
34 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 421, 444–49 (2011).
61
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government.70 In short, the opinion rested on the plain meaning theory of
the text, something ordinarily associated with Justices other than Justice
Stevens.71
The explanation for this flight to textualism, I think, lies in the
introduction and Part I of the opinion, describing the “well-documented rise
in global temperatures” and the consensus among “[r]espected scientists”
that carbon dioxide concentrations are at least partly responsible for this.72
Justice Stevens and his colleagues clearly thought the Bush Administration
was stonewalling on the problem of climate change, and that this was
unreasonable in the face of mounting cause for concern. Statutory
interpretation, in this case of the textualist variety, allowed the Court to use
judicial review to perform a nudging function—forcing the administration
and Congress to reconsider apparent underregulation of a problem of global
dimensions.
The third landmark Stevens opinion is Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,73 one in a
series of dramatic decisions by the Supreme Court in the final years of the
George W. Bush Administration concerning the rights of terror suspects
held by the government at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.74 Hamdan, who was
alleged to have been Osama bin Laden’s personal driver and bodyguard,
was a Yemeni national apprehended in Afghanistan during the battles with
the Taliban in 2001.75 He was sent to Guantánamo, and eventually was
scheduled to be tried for conspiracy by a specially constituted military
commission.76
Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens determined that the military
commission had no jurisdiction to hear the charges against Hamdan.77
Among the many issues resolved in the lengthy opinion, a key conclusion
was that the military commission violated a provision of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice that requires military commissions and courts martial to
observe procedures that are “uniform insofar as practicable.”78 The
procedures to be followed by the military commission deviated from those
followed in courts martial in critical respects. The President of the United
States, according to Justice Stevens, had failed to offer any persuasive
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reason why uniformity was not “practicable” in the circumstances of the
Guantánamo terror suspects.79
Dozens of sharply contested legal issues were presented in Hamdan—
issues regarding the meaning of international treaties, military statutes, the
law of war, U.S. military common law, military treatises, and Supreme
Court precedent.80 Although much of this was far removed from the types of
issues with which the Court is familiar, Justice Stevens resolved all these
issues by exercising pure independent judgment—and resolved them all
against the government. There was not a word about deference to the
President’s understanding of the law in a matter clearly at the core of his
military and foreign affairs functions.81 This is in striking contrast to the
general tenor of the Court’s jurisprudence, which has nearly always
afforded the strongest deference to the Executive in such matters.82
The proverbial visitor from another planet who had no information
beyond the opinions in Hamdan would be hard pressed to explain the
complete lack of deference to the President’s determination that it was not
“practicable” to use the same procedures for trying suspected foreign
terrorists as are used in trying U.S. military personnel charged with crimes
while on active duty.83 But the reason was obvious enough to anyone who
lived through this era. The case was decided in the midst of enormous
criticism of the President and his administration for its aggressive treatment
of detainees, especially for the use of waterboarding and other harsh
interrogation techniques.84 Hamdan was designed to send a message to the
Executive that it had gone too far in its treatment of detainees. Judicial
79
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review was once again performing a checking function, pushing the
Executive back toward a posture more consistent with what Justice Stevens
regarded as prudent.
The final canonical Justice Stevens opinion is of course Chevron itself.
Chevron too can be seen as performing an equilibrium-preserving
function—as using judicial review to push back against behavior of other
institutions perceived as having gone off track or as having locked on to
unreasonable positions. In this case, however, the institution being checked
was not an administrative agency, but rather the D.C. Circuit. The Court in
Chevron was confronted with a line of D.C. Circuit decisions holding that a
plant-wide or “bubble” definition of stationary sources of air pollution must
always be used in sections of the Act designed to preserve air quality, but
can never be used in sections of the Act designed to improve air quality.85
Justice Stevens’s meticulous unraveling of the administrative and
legislative history established that this was not a distinction intended by
Congress.86 Nor was it the distinction the EPA would have adopted if left to
its own devices. It was a distinction thrust on the agency by rival panels of
the D.C. Circuit, each pursuing its own policy preferences. Chevron was
designed to reign in the D.C. Circuit from meddling with policy
determinations clearly more suited to the agency. Hence the genesis of the
passages about implied delegations and democratic accountability.
Notice that three of the four canonical decisions—Benzene,
Massachusetts, and Hamdan—gave no deference to the executive position,
as Chevron, certainly in its institutional choice incarnation, would lead one
to expect. Moreover, two of the three decisions giving no deference eschew
the integrative method; neither Benzene nor Massachusetts made much
effort to measure the administrative view against the larger fabric of the
law. Hamdan was written as an integrative decision, and Justice Stevens’s
opinion assiduously sought to reconcile his conclusions with prior
precedents and military authorities.87 But it made no effort to square its
aggressive interpretation of these precedents with the larger tradition of
deference to executive judgments in foreign and military affairs. The
continuing turmoil over how to handle detainees accused of having links to
terror groups suggests that the Court gave inadequate weight to the
Administration’s concern for the “practicalities” of the issue.
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What each of the nondeferential opinions was designed to do was to
deliver a jolt to the legal system—to cause it to reconsider the course it was
pursuing. In other words, they were designed to rein in particular deviations
from the path of reason by other branches of government. Chevron, I
suggest, was the product of a similar aspiration, directed to the D.C. Circuit
rather than the Executive.
IV. THE IMPERATIVE OF INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE
The jolt delivered by Chevron took a path wholly unforeseen by its
author and the other members of the Court who joined his opinion. It
became, over time, a landmark decision invoked for the institutional choice
conception of the judicial review function. This unanticipated consequence,
I would suggest, is one of the risks one takes in conceiving of judicial
review as an equilibrium-preserving function, applied in case-specific
fashion. Decisions motivated by a desire to nudge particular actors back
toward the path of reason, as perceived by the Court, are likely to be
misperceived by the next generation of jurists as stating principles that can
be generalized beyond the circumstances that produced them.
I would go further and argue that the case-specific conception of
judicial review—as least if deployed by the Supreme Court—is inadequate
to the needs of the modern administrative state. The Supreme Court decides
only a limited number of cases (currently around eighty) each year. Only a
fraction of these cases involve the powers of the Executive and the myriad
administrative bodies that perform executive functions. Episodic decisions
by a tribunal grounded in perceptions about the particularities of a small
number of cases cannot possibly generate a set of internally coherent
principles that can be drawn upon by lower courts and agencies to resolve
the proliferating complexities generated by the system. The system requires
a stable set of rules about the allocation of authority over regulatory policy,
not a series of ad hoc interventions by a committee of elders designed to
nudge particular institutions back to the path of wisdom as they see it.
A majority of Justices have now realized, in one decision or another,
that some version of the institutional choice perspective is needed to
provide consistent and predictable guidance to lower courts and
administrators.88 The process has been severely hampered by the resistance
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of Justices Scalia and Breyer, both (ironically) former administrative law
professors. Justice Scalia’s resistance takes the form of an overblown
conception of what courts should decide at step one of Chevron, using
aggressive statutory interpretation.89 Justice Breyer’s resistance takes the
form of a conception of the Court as a kind of supervising agency for the
entire administrative state. In a curious twist of fate, it may fall to Justice
Stevens’s successor, Justice Elena Kagan—another former administrative
law professor—to resolve the matter. Justice Kagan has written insightfully
about Chevron from an institutional choice perspective.90 Her predecessor,
although the author of Chevron, was never comfortable with this
perspective. He was the Court’s last great common law lawyer. His
retirement may mark the passing of the common law approach to judicial
review, but this may be inevitable and necessary, at least in the context of
administrative law.

Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 390–92 (1999) (Kennedy, J.) (extending Chevron to regulations adopted
under statute expressly conferring de novo review on courts). His opinion for the Court in Gonzalez v.
Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 258–260 (2006), is arguably equilibrium preserving in spirit but in form is
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Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 665–67 (2007) (Alito, J.) (adopting broad
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